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We analyze the impact of profit sharing on the share of workers receiving training. An effect 
is plausible because: 1) profit sharing is a credible commitment by firms to reward firm-
specific skills acquired by formal or informal training, 2) profit sharing may reduce turnover 
and increase the returns to training, 3) a common payment for the whole workforce leads to 
peer group pressure to participate in training courses and raises incentives to help co-
workers. In order to eliminate possible selectivity effects, we combine a matching approach 
with difference-in-differences. We identify the proportion of employees participating in profits 
and differentiate profit sharing according to the percentage of the workers covered by such 
remuneration schemes. Using German establishment data we find that profit sharing only has 
a significant effect on training intensity if the majority of the workforce benefits from it. 
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1. Introduction 
For obvious reasons incentives are of utmost interest in economics and for many years 
economists have analyzed the application and effects of incentive payments. One variant of 
performance-linked remuneration is profit sharing. This group incentive scheme implies that a 
part of the compensation of (almost) all employees is variable and depends on the overall 
profits of the firm. A large number of empirical studies report the effects of profit sharing on 
company performance, where productivity, profitability, wages and employment are 
frequently analyzed. The reason most commonly suggested for the observed better 
performance is the incentive effect of a variable remuneration and, as profit sharing is a group 
incentive, peer group pressure to accord to somehow defined performance standards. 
Although this is probably the main reason for the frequently reported higher performance of 
organizations with a profit sharing system, there might also be indirect effects at work. The 
purpose of our study is to investigate the effect of profit sharing on training intensity as 
another possible cause of higher productivity. 
Clearly, human capital is of prime importance not only for the productivity but also for the 
profitability of a company. The literature on human capital
1 does not usually discuss the role 
of incentive payments like profit sharing. However, a collective incentive system may well 
affect investment in human capital. If a sharing system is employed, a return on investment 
costs is automatically guaranteed, as a binding arrangement regulates the use of profits. This 
is not always the case in a traditional wage system, as wages are largely determined by other 
factors such as seniority or favoritism of specific groups who have a particular bargaining 
power. 
                                                 
1Becker (1962, 1964) developed a framework for analyzing investment in and returns to specific and general 
qualifications. A survey of the theoretical literature is given by Leuven (2005) and a recent comparative 
empirical study was conducted by Arulampalam, Booth and Bryan (2004). Later contributions (Katz and 
Zidermann, 1990, Chang and Wang, 1996, Acemoglu and Pischke, 1999a,b, Stevens, 1994) considered market 
imperfections, such as asymmetric information and imperfect information, and modified Becker’s conclusion on 
the financing of human capital investment. 
  1Profit sharing is an extreme form of group incentives, as the “group” consists of the whole 
workforce. Every member of the organization then has an interest in a high productivity of 
their co-workers and will encourage participation in training courses as any increase in 
productivity will benefit her/his own income. Furthermore, every member of the workforce 
has a self-interest in helping colleagues during training on-the-job.  
As emphasized by many authors, profit sharing is expected to align interests of employers and 
employees. One consequence may be lower employee turnover. Moreover, if profit sharing is 
an add-on and not a substitute of the going wage rate, total remuneration will increase. This 
also has a negative impact on quits. Clearly, longer expected tenure positively affects the 
incentives to invest in firm-specific human capital. Hence, the training decision may be one 
cause of the frequently observed better performance of companies with a sharing system.  
Despite the given relevance, the relation between profit sharing and training is rarely 
analyzed. The only papers of which we are aware are Azfar and Danninger (2001), Parent 
(2004) and Gielen (2007). The authors all apply information from household panels, whereas 
we use company data for our empirical analysis.  Azfar and Danninger (2001) and Gielen 
(2007) emphasize the negative effect of profit sharing on turnover, which in turn increases 
expected tenure and raises incentives for investing in firm-specific human capital. Parent 
(2004) regards profit sharing as a credible commitment of firms to reward the acquisition of 
firm-specific skills.  
Our contributions to this topic are the following ones: Firstly our data allow us to disaggregate 
the profit sharing variable. We differentiate between firms where only a small, medium or 
large share of all workers benefit from profit sharing. This appears to be important because 
the percentage of workers of an establishment covered by profit sharing varies enormously.  
It is well known that in the absence of tax incentives or mandatory requirement only a 
minority of all firms use profit sharing. Given the overwhelming empirical evidence on the 
beneficial effects of profit sharing this seems to be paradoxical. As it is very unlikely that the 
  2majority of all firms behave irrationally over a longer period, we suppose that selectivity 
effects are at work. Either only some firms have specific advantages from using such a 
scheme or firms which introduce it are in general the more efficient ones. In both cases simple 
cross-sectional comparisons would overestimate the average effect for all firms. Therefore, 
we apply modern econometric methods to take into account selectivity effects. This is done 
with respect to observable as well as unobservable factors responsible for sample selectivity 
by applying matching and conditional difference-in-differences. We find that profit sharing 
increases the training intensity, but only if the majority of all workers participate in this 
incentive payment.  
The paper is structured as follows. The next section contains a short theoretical discussion of 
the impact of profit sharing on training. Section 3 describes the econometric methodology 
used for our estimations. In Sections 4 and 5 we present our data and the results of the 
empirical analysis before we conclude in Section 6. 
 
2. Theoretical Considerations 
The relevance of human capital for the success of firms and the growth of economies is 
undisputed. Along with technical progress it determines productivity and the performance of 
companies. Reflecting its importance, human capital formation is an intensely investigated 
issue in economics; yet it is rarely discussed in connection with collective incentive systems. 
In particular the causal relation running from profit sharing to training is largely ignored
2.  
Many empirical studies have shown that firms which use incentive systems such as profit 
sharing are more successful, measured in terms of productivity and profitability.
3 The superior 
                                                 
2 The very interesting and innovative literature on human resource management policy deals with, among other 
things, both training and incentive payments, but not with any causal relationship between them. Many studies 
analyze, for example, how HRM practices affect productivity, and emphasize that complementarities among 
work practices can amplify a positive impact, but do not consider causal relations between the measures (see for 
example Huselid, 1995 or Ichniowski, Shaw and Prennushi, 1997). 
3 Studies analysing such effects of profit sharing are e.g. FitzRoy and Kraft (1987), Möller (2000), for Germany; 
Wadhwani and Wall (1990), Kruse (1992), Doucouliagos (1995), Cahuc and Dormont (1997), Blasi et al. (2008) 
with data from other countries. 
  3performance is usually explained by improved motivation of the workers, who increase their 
effort. Productivity is, however, also the result of the qualification of the employees, which 
tends to be ignored when the effects of incentive schemes are discussed. 
Profit sharing is a group-based incentive payment and an alternative to purely individual wage 
payments. This also alters incentives concerning training. Becker (1962, 1964) has shown that 
costs for investment into firm-specific human capital have to be shared between the firm and 
the employee in order to avoid moral hazard problems. Profit sharing provides a credible 
commitment on the part of the firm to share all additional returns. Hence the moral hazard 
problem is at least mitigated.  
Recent contributions, like Acemoglu and Pischke (1999a, b), demonstrate that a compressed 
wage structure implies incentives for the firm to invest in general employee training. There 
are several sources of wage compression. One reason for this is the existence of incomplete 
competition in the labor market, which implies that a skilled worker has few alternative 
employers at his or her disposal and the firm has some monopsony power. Hence, even if 
qualifications are general, the employee is unlikely to quit, although the wage is below her 
productivity. In this case it also pays for the company to invest in general human capital. 
Another reason could be information asymmetries, first suggested by Katz and Ziderman 
(1990) who argue that asymmetric information might play an important role in the context of 
general training. If potential employers are looking for new employees, they are less well 
informed about the skills a worker possesses than the current employer who trained this 
person. This reduces the advantages that a generally trained worker can gain by changing his 
or her job. If employees with general skills have no incentive to move to another firm, 
employers will (at least partly) pay for general training. But also if employers bear (part of) 
the cost for general training, employees must still be willing to participate in training courses. 
  4This will only be the case if workers can be sure that they will benefit from their training 
effort.
 4
The idea of a collective incentive system is to provide a clear basis for sharing returns, which 
are jointly created by capital and labor. Any increase in performance is divided between the 
factors of production. Profit sharing systems are not usually abandoned by the company and 
have simple rules concerning the division of profits. Thus, profit sharing provides a credible 
commitment on the part of the firm to share all additional returns. Parent (2004) motivates the 
necessity for a commitment by the very nature of specific skills. These skills are worthless 
outside of the particular firm and therefore no market value exists. Hence, there are no market 
forces at work which would lead to an optimal sharing rule. By introducing profit sharing, it is 
fixed that workers get a share of the profits and they can be confident that they will not be 
held up after investing time and money in the acquisition of specific skills.  
As more recent theoretical approaches suggest that firms also have an incentive to invest in 
the general skills of their workers, as in the case of specific training, it is not guaranteed that 
employees will get a fair share of the training benefits. Therefore, the positive effect of profit 
sharing as a binding commitment also applies with regard to general training.  
Economists are sometimes surprised that profit sharing has any beneficial effects at all as the 
value of any productivity increase has to be shared with all other employees. However, 
obviously the worker in question has to bear alone the disutility from increased effort. This is 
called the 1/N (with N being the number of employees) or free rider problem. This problem is 
also present in the case of training investments. The return of any further education has to be 
shared with all the others in the firm. Hence, the pay-outs resemble a prisoner's dilemma, 
where joint cooperative action would lead to an improvement on individual cheating, but the 
highest pay-out is received only if all others play cooperatively (invest in human capital) but I 
do not. However, in contrast to the classical prisoner’s dilemma the behavior of the other 
                                                 
4  In the empirical section we use a variable concerning training participation, but we have no information as to 
whether such training courses impart specific or general knowledge. 
  5players is observed during the game and can be influenced by peer group pressure
5. 
Furthermore, cooperation at work takes place every day and hence a repeated game would be 
much more appropriate to represent the situation than a one-shot prisoner’s dilemma.
6  
With a collective incentive payment every member of the group has a strong interest in a good 
performance by their co-workers. Hence, monitoring by a foreman is substituted or 
complemented by supervision on the same hierarchical level. This kind of supervision is 
probably very efficient and at the same time cost minimizing.   
With regard to profit sharing, shared pay-outs imply that every member of the organization 
benefits from higher productivity of other members. It now pays to support on-the-job 
training of colleagues, since profit sharing creates a monetary reward for pushing co-workers 
to train more intensively. Perhaps even more important is that in such a situation it is in the 
interest of every employee to help others at the workplace. Hence, training-on-the-job will be 
intensified, become more efficient and most likely be much cheaper than if it is done by 
supervisors.   
Additionally, profit sharing may have several effects on employee turnover. If paid on top of 
the going wage rate, profit sharing increases total remuneration
7. As quits are partly 
determined by monetary factors, turnover will decline
8. Work relations may also be affected 
as the intention of profit sharing is an alignment of interests of capital owners and workers. 
These factors in turn increase expected tenure and lead to a higher investment in specific 
human capital (see e.g. Azfar and Danninger, 2001). With a higher level of specific human 
capital the firm also reduces dismissals, as it wants to retain its investment
9. 
                                                 
5 For the effects of peer group pressure, see Kandel and Lazear (1992). 
6 High pressure on every co-worker to behave cooperatively will not be present if individual payment systems 
are employed and in tournaments we would just observe the contrary. Then sabotage would be rational. 
7 Kraft and Ugarkovic (2007) show that profit sharing is not a substitute for the usual wage rate.  
8 It is sometimes supposed that profit sharing is a substitute for the fixed wage and helps to stabilize employment 
over the business cycle by rendering remuneration more flexible. However, even if profit sharing is not a 
substitute for the going wage rate, but an add-on, it can be argued that its use will lead to more stable 
employment. 
9 If the firm finances general investment as well, the incentives to keep the employees are enhanced. 
  6Clearly, as an alternative to joint incentives, a working and flexible individual wage system 
could offer efficient rewards for any investment. However, not every firm has such an 
efficient wage system. Wages are frequently determined by bargaining with a union and then 
other factors besides efficiency, such as seniority or power of specific groups within the 
negotiating union, affect remuneration. Furthermore, efficient rewards require an exact 
identification of the productivity effects of training, which is in many cases rather difficult as 
only the aggregate output is observed. Performance evaluation is frequently subjective, 
leaving room for evaluators’ preferences, biases, discriminations and favoritism (Prendergast 
and Topel, 1993). This is all absent with binding arrangements as it is usually done in the case 
of profit sharing. 
 
3. Econometric Methodology 
In Western industrialized countries only a minority of all firms make use of the instrument of 
profit sharing. According to the statistics of the European Commission (Poutsma, 2001) the 
percentage of firms with a profit sharing system in the European Union is quite low except 
when tax or other incentives encourage the use of this payment method as it is the case in 
France and the United Kingdom (Table 1).
10  
Probably the majority of capital owners do behave rationally by not using profit sharing. 
Hence, there may be other reasons which inhibit apparently useful variable remuneration 
schemes. It is most likely that some firms have specific advantages in implementing them. 
There may be special conditions with respect to, for example, the work content (simple or 
demanding) or verification possibilities of the individual performance due to work 
organization (team versus individual tasks), that are responsible for the working of profit 
sharing. That means that firms with specific characteristics may use profit sharing, while 
                                                 
10 Poutsma (2001) extensively discusses the country differences concerning financial participation in various 
member states of the European Union. 
 
  7others have no interest in such a kind of incentive and in contrast rely on other motivational 
instruments such as efficiency wages, tournaments or piece rates. 
 
               Table 1 – Incidence of profit sharing in selected countries 











            Source: Poutsma, 2001. 
 
Hence, to analyze the effect of profit sharing on training, a mere comparison of firms with and 
without such a remuneration system is not appropriate. Different econometric approaches are 
suggested to account for factors that could affect a firm’s probability to introduce profit 
sharing. One popular method to overcome the problem of selectivity in terms of observable 
factors is matching
11. The idea of this method is to compare the outcome of a treated group 
with the outcome of a similar group without treatment, which substitutes the counterfactual 
outcome (the outcome of a firm with treatment if it was not treated).
12 Additionally, in order 
to remove the influence of unobserved time-invariant characteristics, we use a conditional 
difference-in-differences estimation, which combines matching with a before-after 
comparison.  
                                                 
11 We want to know if profit sharing can increase incentives for a firm to invest in human capital. Given that we 
are actually interested in this causal effect, a simple regression would clearly not be sufficient. If assignment to 
the treatment group is not random, selection bias in estimating the effect of profit sharing on training can occur 
because the error term and the treatment variable are correlated. We observe that the different treatment groups 
and the group of firms without profit sharing differ in many respects. Therefore, it is our view that assignment to 
treatment is unlikely to be random, selectivity is a problem and we try to control for it with our approach.  
12 Matching is mainly used to evaluate the effects of active labour market programs, see e.g. Lechner and 
Wunsch (2009) and Lechner, Miquel and Wunsch (forthcoming). 
  8A closer look at the proportion of the workforce which is covered by the sharing system 
reveals that in many cases only a small proportion of all employees participate in profit 
sharing. That could mean that incentive payments are only used for the top management.
13 A 
variable and profit-related remuneration for the top management is also an incentive scheme, 
but it is very different from letting all employees of an establishment participate. Hence, it 
appears to be crucial to identify the share of workers who actually benefit from profit sharing.  
We divide our treatment group of profit sharing firms into three different dummy variables. 
The most important treatment in our analysis is profit sharing for the majority of the workers 
(PS=3), whereas PS=1 represents establishments, where only a small percentage of the 
employees is covered by a profit related payment. All establishments with a coverage between 
the two corresponding threshold values fall in category PS=2 and firms without profit sharing 
are represented by PS=0.  
The matching framework for binary treatments is extended to multiple treatments by Imbens 
(2000) and Lechner (2001, 2002a, b)
14. Following Lechner’s procedure there are M+1 
different treatments with outcomes Y
0,Y
1,…,Y
M. For each treatment m only Y
m can be 
observed and all other outcomes are counterfactuals. In the case of multiple treatments each 
group can be used as treatment as well as comparison group. The average treatment effect of 
treatment m relative to treatment l is 
 
    .     (1) 
ml m l E(Y -Y  | PS=m) = E(Y | PS=m) - E(Y | PS=m)
 
                                                 
13 Unfortunately, the data we use provides no information on which type of employees (e.g. with respect to their 
occupational position) benefits from profit sharing in a specific firm. 
14Matching for multiple or continuous treatments has mainly been applied before to the evaluation of active labor 
market policy programs. Lechner, Miquel and Wunsch (2007), for example, use this method to distinguish 
between different training programs for the unemployed and their effects on the outcomes of interest. The 
multiple treatment approach is less often applied to other topics. One exception is Görg, Henry and Strobl (2008) 
who investigate the effects of government support on exporting activity by distinguishing between small, 
medium and large subsidies. They also combine multiple treatment matching with difference-in-differences. 
  9E(Y
l| PS=m) stands for the counterfactual outcome. By definition, the counterfactual outcome 
is not observable since it describes the hypothetical outcome of not using profit sharing (or 
having a different level PS=l of profit sharing) in a company which in fact applies a specific 
level of profit sharing (PS=m). Therefore, a comparable counterpart for every treated firm 
must be found among the group of firms without or with another treatment. If the treatment 
status was considered as randomly assigned, the average outcome of firms with treatment l 
E(Y
l | PS=l) could serve as an estimator for E(Y
l| PS=m). Without random assignment the 
problem in equation (1) could be solved if the characteristics which promote the 
establishment’s decision to apply profit sharing for a certain proportion of the workforce can 
be determined. For these purposes Rubin (1977) introduced the conditional independence 
assumption (CIA) for binary treatments. Lechner (2001) shows that the CIA can be redefined 
for multiple treatments. The CIA states that the potential outcomes Y
l and Y
m are independent 
of the treatment status PS for firms with the same observable characteristics X: 
 
     .         ( 2 )  
ml Y, Y P S | X ⊥
 
We use propensity score matching proposed by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) to overcome 
the high dimensionality problem caused by the large number of determinants of profit sharing 
X. The propensity score is a function of the vector X and describes the propensity of 
introducing a certain level of profit sharing. Now firms with similar propensity scores are 




                                                 
15 More precisely, we use nearest neighbor matching with two neighbors as this improves the matching quality 
compared to the case where we only use one nearest neighbor. In addition to nearest neighbor matching we also 
tried other matching methods, e.g. kernel matching, which leads to similar results.  
16 Matching with replacement allows the observations of the control group to serve for different matches. It 
avoids the problem that treated and control units with different probabilities must be matched if there are only 
few similar comparison units. The disadvantage of matching with replacement is a higher variance due to the 
smaller number of control units used (Dehejia and Wahba, 2002).  
  10However, unobservable factors might also influence the impact of profit sharing. To 
additionally control for these factors the conditional difference-in-differences approach is 
appropriate. It combines the advantages of non-parametric matching and a difference-in-
differences comparison. Just like in the first case, where we look at the existence of different 
profit sharing intensities in 2009, we also estimate treatment effects for multiple treatments 
when analyzing the implementation of profit sharing between 2007 and 2009. Using the 
difference-in-differences estimator, the average treatment effect of treatment m relative to 
treatment l is the difference between the change in the outcome of firms with treatment m and 
those with treatment m during the considered period: 
 
    .        ( 3 )  
mm l l
t1 t0 t1 t0 E ( Y- Y)  -  E ( Y- Y)
 
To control for observable as well as unobservable heterogeneity, the conditional difference-
in-differences approach compares the difference of the changes of outcomes of treated and 
matched firms without treatment or with another treatment. Therefore, the second part of 
equation (3) is replaced by the difference in the outcome of matched establishments. 
Difference-in-differences controls for common time trends and permanent differences 
between the two groups considered. A crucial assumption for difference-in-differences to be 
valid is that firms with and without profit sharing do not seriously change in their unobserved 
characteristics over time (see e.g. Blundell and Costa Dias, 2009). Even though we do not 
know whether this assumption holds, we view the combination of matching and difference-in-
differences as the best possible method currently available to deal with observable and 
unobservable heterogeneity. As our observation period is not very long, we can be quite 
optimistic that there are no serious changes in the relevant variables over time.
17    
                                                 
17 What exactly is the value added of this methodology over simple linear regression? In a cross-sectional 
framework, linear regression will not shed light on the impact of an introduction of profit sharing. This is, 
  11To sum up, our approach is the following: We distinguish between different levels of profit 
sharing intensity and analyze the effects of these different levels. First we analyze the 
existence of a certain profit sharing intensity in 2009. We compare the outcomes of the three 
different profit sharing levels (m=1, 2, 3) with the outcome of firms without profit sharing. 
Afterwards we consider the introduction of profit sharing between 2007 and 2009. Therefore, 
we use a second sample and can additionally control for unobservable differences between the 
treatment and the control groups by combining matching with difference-in-differences 
(conditional difference-in-differences).  
In order to compute the propensity scores we specify multinomial logit models. Although the 
endogenous variable is based on the percentage of employees with profit sharing, we do not 
treat it as an ordered but as an unordered variable model. In our sample the majority of 
establishments with profit sharing offer it either to almost all or to a very small share of 
employees. We prefer the multinomial over the ordered logit model, because there appear to 
be different motives at work, if an establishment introduces a profit sharing scheme for all 
workers or applies it only to a minority. 
As an alternative to multinomial logit or probit models Lechner (2001, 2002a, b) suggests the 
estimation of binary choice models for each subsample of firms with treatments m and l (or 
without treatment) for all different combinations of treatments. As a robustness test, we 
                                                                                                                                                         
however, the main contribution of difference-in-differences. The general advantages of matching over linear 
regression analysis are that the former is non-parametric and it imposes the common support assumption. In the 
absence of common support the model needs to be extrapolated over unobservable regions of the distribution of 
the right-hand variables. Clearly, the common support assumption could also be imposed within the linear 
regression framework, but “Most frequently, researchers seem unaware that a common support problem exists” 
(Blundell and Costa Dias 2009, 599). Furthermore, it is well known that in a regression framework any possible 
endogenous relations running from training to the right-hand side variables would bias all coefficients. As shown 
by Frölich (2008), a nonparametric matching estimator permits endogenous control variables, as long as profit-
sharing does not determine the control variables. The reason for this result is that nonparametric matching 
compares only observations which have the same values for the control variables and differ only in the treatment 
variable, whereas parametric regression combines all observations in a single regression.  
Heckman et al. (1998) show that possible bias from ignoring selectivity comes from three sources: 1) neglect of 
common support 2) observed heterogeneity 3) unobserved heterogeneity. Conditional difference-in-differences 
takes account of all three factors while linear regression only considers observed heterogeneity. Smith and Todd 
(2005) point to the relevance of difference-in-differences in addition to matching in establishing robustness of 
the results.  
 
  12additionally follow this approach, both for existence and introduction of different profit 
sharing levels. 
 
4. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
For our estimations we use the German IAB Establishment Panel of the Institute for 
Employment Research of the German Federal Employment Agency. It is a representative 
survey of German establishments employing at least one employee covered by social 
insurance. Data have been collected annually since 1993. The IAB Establishment Panel was 
extended to cover East German establishments in 1998. Since 2001 more than 15000 
establishments have been observed every year. The IAB Establishment Panel provides 
detailed information on many labor market topics. The main part of the questionnaire is 
identical every year. The panel includes annual information about general topics like turnover, 
the number of employees and wages. But there are also questions which are only posed 
irregularly. Data on the number of participants in training are available for nine waves of the 
survey
18. Training intensity is computed by dividing the number of persons taking part in 
training in the first six months of the year by the total number of employees. Data on profit 
sharing are provided for 1998, 2000, 2001, 2005, 2007 and 2009. Along with the question of 
whether the establishment offers profit sharing at all, in 2000, 2001, 2005 and 2009 the 
question is also asked which proportion of employees benefits from it. We use this 
information to construct our treatment variables for the multiple treatment approach. 
We use two different samples for our estimations. Regarding the existence of profit sharing as 
treatment variable we use data for 2009 and construct our first sample. It consists of 4742 
                                                 
18 More precisely, training information is available for the waves 1993, 1997, 1999, 2001, 2003, 2005, 2007, 
2008 and 2009. 
  13non-treated and 1075 profit sharing firms, with 1067 of them also reporting the share of 
employees involved in profit sharing
19.  
For the 1067 firms with information on profit sharing intensity, Figure 1 presents the 
distribution of the proportion of employees whose remuneration partly depends on a firm’s 
performance. It is obvious that the mere existence of profit sharing does not imply that it is 
applied to the whole workforce. On the one hand in more than 40 percent of all profit sharing 
establishments, all employees of the firm participate. On the other hand in one third of all 
profit sharing firms, less than 20 percent of the workforce is covered by profit sharing. 
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 Source: IAB Establishment Panel, wave 2009, own calculations (controlled remote data access via FDZ). 
 
These figures indicate that responding firms and researchers may interpret the question 
differently. The literature on profit sharing usually assumes that all or at least most of the 
employees of an establishment receive, besides a fixed wage, a variable profit-related part, 
                                                 
19 We only consider establishments with at least 5 employees for our analysis. Furthermore we exclude non-
profit firms and establishments from the forestry, agriculture and fisheries sector. 
  14whereas in practice almost half of the profit sharing firms in our sample only let a minority of 
their workforce participate. In such cases it is quite likely that profit sharing applies only to 
the top management. The impact of such a variable remuneration system for the top 
management is also an interesting and much discussed issue
20, but it has nothing to do with 
the common notion of profit sharing. Hence, we focus on establishments with a high ratio of 
employees participating in profit sharing. For this purpose we divide establishments with 
profit sharing and distinguish between three treatments. In our first sample, where we 
consider the existence of a profit sharing scheme in 2009, treatment PS=1 is defined as profit 
sharing for less than 20% of all employees. The second treatment PS=2 represents profit 
sharing for at least 20% up to 99% of the workforce and PS=3 for all workers. 
For our second sample, where we look at the introduction of profit sharing between 2007 and 
2009, we identify all establishments which do not have a profit sharing system in 2007. The 
treatment observations are defined as those firms which introduced profit sharing between 
2007 and 2009, whereas the control group consists of all firms without profit sharing 
throughout this period. We obtain a sample of 333 establishments which introduced profit 
sharing (four of these do not report profit sharing intensity) and 3670 firms without such a 
remuneration scheme. One third of the establishments introducing profit sharing offer it to at 
most 10 percent and one third to more than 95 percent of their workers. Hence, we define 
treatment PS=1 as profit sharing for less than 10 % of all employees, the second treatment 
PS=2 as profit sharing for at least 10% up to 95% of the workforce and PS=3 as profit sharing 
for 96% or more.
21  
                                                 
20 Representative references include Jensen and Murphy (1990) and Hall and Liebmann (1998). 
21 We also tried different classifications for our samples (e.g. dividing the data into just two groups), which leads 
to similar results. Nevertheless, based on the bimodal distribution of profit sharing intensity it is reasonable to 
construct two different treatment groups which include the firms around the two peaks of the distribution and to 
put the remaining observations into a third group. Firms with intermediate profit sharing intensity appear to be 
different from the firms with low or high intensity (e.g. these firms are much smaller) and therefore we think we 
should not put them in the same group with one of the other two treatments.  
  15In our first sample only about 18.5 percent of all establishments use a profit sharing system in 
2009 and in the second sample about 8.3 percent of those without profit sharing in 2007 
introduce it by 2009. Not even half of those can be seen as profit sharing firms in the 
“classical” sense as they offer it to only a small proportion of the workforce. Therefore, 
different selectivity effects could render a simple comparison of treated and non-treated firms 
invalid.  
Hence, we match firms with different coverage levels and without profit sharing with regard 
to the determinants of this financial incentive scheme. In the literature a number of variables 
are discussed which may affect the application of a sharing system for the workforce (see e.g. 
OECD, 1995, Pendleton et al., 2003). The following results for the mean values relate to the 
second sample which considers the introduction of profit sharing
22.  
Table 2 presents the mean values of all relevant variables for establishments which introduce 
or never use profit sharing between 2009 and 2007 as well as the mean values for the three 
different levels of multiple treatments at the beginning of the treatment period in 2007 (only 
the difference of the training intensity is measured as the difference between 2007 and 2009). 
A comparison of the mean values of the change in the share of trained persons between 2009 
and 2007 confirms our basic hypothesis. In firms which introduced profit sharing between 
2007 and 2009, the share of employees taking part in training increased from the first half of 
2007 to the first half of 2009 by 7 percentage points which is significantly higher than the 
respective value of 1.5 percentage points in firms without a profit sharing system. However, a 
significant increase in the training intensity can only be found if a large proportion of 
employees participate in the sharing. Compared to establishments without profit sharing, 
firms with profit sharing for the majority of workers (PS=3) realize a higher difference in 
training intensity of 10 percentage points. 
                                                 
22 The mean values for firms with and without profit sharing and the different profit sharing intensities for the 
first sample (existence of profit sharing in 2009) can be found in Table A1 in the Appendix. 
























Difference of training intensity 
between 2009 and 2007   0.015 0.070*** 0.052  0.040 0.115*** 
Establishment size <20  0.540  0.291***  0.037***  0.401***  0.346*** 
Establishment  size  20-49  0.210 0.267** 0.268 0.292** 0.227 
Establishment size 50-249  0.203  0.318***  0.439***  0.234  0.336*** 
Establishment size 250-499  0.031  0.075***  0.182***  0.0437  0.036 
Establishment size 500+  0.018  0.048***  0.073***  0.029  0.055*** 
Number of employees   60.597  126.664***  180.671***  76.591  152.082*** 
Shift responsibilities (dummy)  0.118  0.201***  0.183*  0.182**  0.236*** 
Teamwork  (dummy)  0.063  0.135*** 0.146*** 0,124*** 0.136*** 
Independent work groups  
(dummy)  0.045  0.108***  0.146*** 0,086** 0.100*** 
Share qualified employees 
(percent)  0.057 0.107*** 0.072 0.126***  0.112*** 
Collective  bargaining  (dummy)  0.434  0.423 0.561** 0.409 0.336** 
Works council (dummy)   0.185  0.348***  0.488***  0.263**  0.364*** 
Export  share  0.059  0.127*** 0.133*** 0.110*** 0.141*** 
ICT investment (dummy)  0.442  0.646***  0.695***  0.606***  0.655*** 
Limited liability (dummy=1 if 
AG, GmbH)  0.599  0.820*** 0.927*** 0.737*** 0.836*** 
Age (dummy=1 if founded after 
1990)  0.518  0.484  0.463 0.438* 0.536 
East German establishment 
(dummy)  0.429 0.393 0.341 0.394 0.436 
N  3670  333 82 137  110 
***/**/* indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level; refers to a t-test comparing the mean values of non-
profit sharing firms with the mean values of profit sharing firms and firms with different profit sharing intensities, 
respectively. 
Source: IAB Establishment Panel, waves 2007-2009, own calculations (controlled remote data access via FDZ). 
 
Turning to the variables which may determine the use of profit sharing, we concentrate on 
comparing firms without a sharing system with those establishments which let at least 96% of 
their employees participate. The size of a firm could have both positive and negative effects 
on the probability to introduce profit sharing. Larger firms may bear the costs of the 
introduction of a new remuneration system more easily. Furthermore, the more employees, 
the more difficult it becomes to monitor them and problems of asymmetric information 
become more severe. If a profit sharing scheme is applied, aims of the employer should 
become aligned with those of the workers, which may cause them to monitor each other. On 
  17the other hand the free rider problem is more severe for larger firms. Firms with a high 
percentage of profit sharing and those without differ significantly in size. Treated firms 
(PS=3) have 152 whereas the non-treated ones only have 61 employees on average. For our 
estimations size is considered by five different size categories (dummy variables for firms 
with 5-19, 20-49, 50-249, 250-499 and at least 500 employees).  
As mentioned above, Human Resources literature suggests that monetary incentives come 
along with other HRM practices. All these measures are expected to be more common in 
establishments whose work organization is very complex and where individual output is 
difficult to observe. Hence we include dummies for different HRM measures: the shift of 
responsibilities, teamwork and independent work groups in our estimations
23. Firms which 
employ sharing systems are also expected to be characterized by a large share of qualified 
employees and by a high investment in information and communication technology. Table 2 
supports these suggestions. All variables mentioned above are significantly different for non-
treated and treated firms if treatment three is considered. These profit sharing firms have a 
considerably higher share of qualified workers and invest more in information and 
communication technology (ICT). In addition, they more often implement forms of non-
monetary incentives. Employee participation is seen as another important factor with regard to 
profit sharing. Profit sharing is easier to implement in a consultative environment where the 
level of trust between employees and management is high. We use the existence of a works 
council to control for a cooperative climate
24. The existence of a works council could also 
help to introduce a sharing system as then management could easily talk with a representative 
body about the exact design of the system. By contrast, the impact of unions on profit sharing 
is not clear. Workers whose earnings partly depend on the firm’s performance are supposed to 
be more strongly affiliated with their employer and less with workers’ representation 
                                                 
23 Employers are asked if these HRM practices were introduced during the last three years.  
24 One could also argue that the existence of a works council stands for the contrary situation, where the 
workforce is in need of a representative body, as industrial relations are controversial. 
  18organizations like unions. The casual observation that unions have been rather hostile towards 
profit sharing systems supports this presumption. However, if profit sharing is paid in 
addition to the base wage, as is documented in a number of empirical studies (see e.g. 
Wadhwani and Wall, 1990, Bhargava and Jenkinson, 1995, Kraft and Ugarkovic, 2007), there 
is at least no financial reason for unions to oppose this kind of remuneration system. We use a 
dummy variable which equals one if a firm is covered by a collective bargaining agreement. 
In our sample not only the share of firms with a works council is significantly higher among 
those with profit sharing for most of the workers, but also the share of firms with a collective 
agreement.  
Introducing a flexible remuneration system may be especially valuable for firms whose profits 
are risky and show a high variance because they could transfer parts of the risk to the 
employees. Hence we include the export share of firms which is significantly higher for 
profit-sharing establishments. It is suggested that the frequency of profit sharing is higher in 
young and growing companies (dummy variable “age”, which equals one if an establishment 
is founded after 1990) which, however, is not supported by our simple comparison of means. 
Moreover, Möller (2000) finds that firms located in East Germany are less likely to introduce 
profit sharing, which cannot be confirmed from our analysis. Finally, we expect profit sharing 
more likely to be introduced in companies with limited liability, i.e. joint stock companies 
(AG) and non-public limited liability companies (GmbH), which is true for firms in our 
sample. Looking at establishments reporting to offer profit sharing to a small percentage of 
employees (PS=1), these firms do not have more qualified workers than the reference group 
of firms without sharing (but the other sharing firms have).  
The comparison of the mean values of the considered determinants points to the relevance of 
selectivity effects. Profit sharing firms are very different from those without this payment 
scheme and in general seem to be the better managed ones. These differences point to strong 
selectivity and therefore we think a method to take account of it is needed.   
  195. Estimation Results   
Existence of profit sharing 
At first, we present the estimations for the matching approach, where we look at the existence 
of different profit sharing levels in 2009 and do not control for unobservable differences yet.  
Table 3 reports the results of the multinomial logit estimation we need to calculate the 
propensity scores.  
 
Table 3 – Results of multinomial logistic regression (existence of profit sharing) 
Variables   PS=1 PS=2 PS=3 
Establishment size 20-49
1 1.493*** 0.492***  0.268 
Establishment size 50-249  2.080*** 0.428** 0.464*** 
Establishment size 250-499  2.527*** 0.927***  0.340 
Establishment size 500+  2.631*** 1.064*** 1.066*** 
Export share  -0.000 0.754**  0.657** 
Share of qualified employees  1.057** 0.977**  1.574*** 
Collective bargaining  0.004 -0.466*** 0.017 
Works council  0.109 0.306*  0.967*** 
Limited liability  0.934*** 0.379** 0.897*** 
Age  0.197 -0.134 0.192 
East German establishment  -0.305** -0.088  0.116 
Shift of responsibilities  0.313** 0.478***  0.401*** 
Teamwork   0.369** 0.183  -0.106 
Independent work groups  0.353*  0.168  0.124 
ICT  investment  0.390*** 0.386*** 0.677*** 
Number of observations  5809     
Pseudo R2        0.169     
***/**/* indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
Note: Industry dummies are included in the analysis but are not reported.  
1Reference group: firms with 5 to 19 employees. 
Source: IAB Establishment Panel, wave 2009, own calculations (controlled remote data access via FDZ). 
 
 
We find that most variables have the expected effects but the impact of several variables 
depends on the coverage level. Larger firms are more likely to use profit sharing, but the size 
effect appears to be more pronounced for establishments with a low or medium coverage 
level. The higher the export share of a firm, the more often it applies profit sharing to a 
medium proportion of employees or to all workers (PS=2 or PS=3), whereas firms with a low 
coverage (PS=1) are less often located in East Germany and are more likely to apply 
  20teamwork or independent work groups. Works councils seem to play an important role 
especially for profit sharing firms where all employees participate in the sharing system 
(PS=3).  
As a robustness check we additionally specify probit models for the subsamples of firms with 
each treatment m and firms without profit sharing (and drop all firms with other treatments l). 
The results of the probit estimations are reported in Table A2 in the Appendix. We now use 
the results of the probit and the multinomial logit estimations to calculate the propensity 
scores we use for our matching procedure. In order to check if our nearest neighbor matching 
was successful, a comparison of the mean values of the exogenous variables after matching is 
required. After matching the differences in the means of the relevant variables between firms 
without profit sharing and those with different profit sharing intensities are strongly reduced 
and there is no longer any significant difference (see Tables A3 and A4 in the Appendix). 
Hence, all our empirical results support the conclusion that selectivity effects are present.  
Table 4 shows the results of matching for the multiple treatments.
25 Our estimation results 
reveal that establishments provide only significantly more training if profit sharing affects at 
least 20 percent of their employees regardless of whether we use multinomial logit or binary 
probit models to obtain the propensity scores.
26 Firms with a medium or high coverage level 
of profit sharing have a higher training intensity of more than 9 percentage points compared to 




                                                 
25 We included the common support restriction, the importance of which is stressed by Heckman et al. (1998). 
Matching is only successful in the range of common support of profit sharing and non-profit sharing firms. 
26 We also estimated average treatment effects for binary treatments, where we only consider the existence or 
introduction of profit sharing, regardless of the percentage of workers covered. The average treatment effects 
after matching and conditional difference-in-differences for these binary treatments can be found in Table A5 in 
the Appendix. We find a positive effect on all treated establishments but, as can be seen in Table 4, this effect is 
driven by those firms which let at least 20 % of the workers participate in the profits. 
27 Other matching methods, such as kernel matching, lead to almost the same results as nearest neighbor 
matching. The magnitude of the treatment effect changes only slightly and the significance remains the same. 
Thus, our matching results are robust. 
  21Table 4 – Estimation results matching 2009
28
Treatment group  Matched firms without profit sharing  Training difference 
Multiple treatments (after multinomial logit) 
PS=1 ( <20% of employees)   N=312 
Training intensity: 0.253 
N=4742 
Training intensity: 0.232  0.022 
PS=2 ( 20% - 99% of employees) N=312 
Training intensity: 0.377 
N=4742 
Training intensity: 0.278  0.099*** 
PS=3 ( 100%% of employees) N=443 
Training intensity: 0.370 
N=4742 
Training intensity: 0.276  0.094*** 
Multiple treatments (after binary probits) 
PS=1 ( <20% of employees)   N=312 
Training intensity: 0.253 
N=4697 
Training intensity: 0.242  0.011 
PS=2 (20%-99% of employees)   N=312 
Training intensity: 0.377 
N=4731 
Training intensity: 0.284  0.092*** 
PS=3 ( 100%% of employees)  N=443 
Training intensity: 0.370 
N=4742 
Training intensity: 0.377  0.097*** 
***/**/* indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
Source: IAB Establishment Panel, wave 2009, own calculations (controlled remote data access via FDZ). 
Note: Industry dummies are included in the analysis but are not reported.  
 
 
Introduction of profit sharing 
After the matching analysis we now present the results for the treatment “introduction of 
profit sharing” where we additionally control for unobservable differences. Therefore, we 
again require a multinomial logit model to estimate the propensity scores.
29 We divide the 
firms which introduce profit sharing as explained in Section 3. 
The results for the introduction of profit sharing presented in Table 5 indicate that, in 
particular, representation of the employees’ interests by a works council and the share of 
qualified employees have strong effects on the introduction of profit sharing for the majority 
of workers (PS=3). Furthermore, the dummy variable indicating export share is only 
significant in the case of medium coverage. In contrast, firm size appears to be relevant 
concerning the decision to introduce profit sharing if only a minority of employees is covered 
(probably the senior management). This last result is quite plausible, as with increasing firm 
size control problems and asymmetric information gain relevance. Our matching procedure 
                                                 
28In some cases we lose some observations due to the common support restriction. Another reason for differing 
numbers of observations is that in some cases one of the industry dummies causes perfectly predicted failure. 
29 In addition to a multinomial logit model we again estimate binary probit models. The estimation results can be 
found in Table A6 in the Appendix. 




Table 5 – Results of multinomial logistic regression (introduction of profit sharing) 
Variables   PS=1 PS=2 PS=3 
Establishment size 20-49
1 2.632*** 0.479**  0.012 
Establishment size 50-249  3.049*** 0.198  0.077 
Establishment size 250-499  3.972*** 0.155  -0.504 
Establishment size 500+  3.712*** 0.461  0.424 
Export share  0.109 0.908** 0.687 
Share of qualified employees  -0.139 1.594*** 1.186* 
Collective bargaining  -0.010 -0.154  -0.617** 
Works council  0.274 0.293  0.666** 
Limited liability  0.888* 0.346  0.743** 
Age  0.149 -0.455** 0.081 
East German establishment  -0.179 0.097 -0.089 
Shift of responsibilities  -0.092 0.190 0.407 
Teamwork   0.300 0.351 0.244 
Independent  work  groups  0.519 0.250 0.342 
ICT investment  0.325  0.335*  0.480** 
Number of observations  3999     
Pseudo R2        0.140     
***/**/* indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
Source: IAB Establishment Panel, waves 2007-2009, own calculations (controlled remote data access via FDZ). 
Note: Industry dummies are included in the analysis but are not reported.  
1Reference group: firms with 5 to 19 employees. 
 
Table 6 presents the results of conditional difference-in-differences. It turns out that, just like 
in the case for existence of profit sharing, the effects of profit sharing depend on the share of 
workers covered.
31 When unobservable heterogeneity is taken into account the result is 
confirmed that profit sharing for a small share of employees (maybe only for managers) has 
no effect on training. Only firms which introduce profit sharing for the majority of the 
                                                 
30 The differences in the means between treated and matched firms are reported in Tables A7 and A8 in the 
Appendix. 
31 If we only consider a binary treatment, the results indicate that firms which introduce profit sharing have a 
significantly higher training intensity compared to firms without profit sharing (see Table A5 in the Appendix). 
However, taking different coverage levels into account, we find that this overall effect is only caused by firms 
with high profit sharing intensity. 
  23workforce show a significant rise in the training intensity.
32 Depending on whether a 
multinomial logit model or binary probit estimations are used to obtain the propensity scores, 
the positive training effect is 8.2 and 11.6 percentage points respectively.
33
 
Table 6 – Estimation results conditional difference-in differences 2007-2009
34
Treatment group  Matched firms without profit sharing  Training difference 
Multiple treatments (after multinomial logit) 
PS=1 ( <20% of employees)   N=82 
Training difference: 0.052 
N=3670 
Training difference: 0.006  0.046 
PS=2 ( 20% - 99% of employees) N=135 
Training difference: 0.036 
N=3670 
Training difference: 0.003  0.033 
PS=3 ( 100%% of employees) N=109 
Training difference: 0.116 
N=3670 
Training difference: 0.033  0.082** 
Multiple treatments (after binary probits) 
PS=1 ( <20% of employees)   N=82 
Training difference: 0.052 
N=3431 
Training difference: 0.006  0.046 
PS=1 (20%-99% of employees)   N=137 
Training difference: 0.040 
N=3330 
Training difference: 0.030  0.011 
PS=3 ( 100%% of employees)  N=110 
Training difference: 0.115 
N=3625 
Training difference: -0.001  0.116*** 
***/**/* indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
Source: IAB Establishment Panel, waves 2007-2009, own calculations (controlled remote data access via FDZ). 
Note: Industry dummies are included in the analysis but are not reported. 
 
6. Conclusion 
We investigate the impact of profit sharing intensity on training. In order to reduce possible 
selectivity effects a matching approach is applied which compares treated units with similar 
untreated units. Unobserved heterogeneity is removed by a conditional difference-in-
differences approach. 
Using a sample of German firms we find that the introduction of profit sharing significantly 
increases the share of employees who get trained. Hence, according to our results, collective 
performance pay works not only due to increased effort by the employees, but also because of 
higher participation in training courses. In our view this is an important contribution toward 
explaining the frequently observed higher productivity of companies with a sharing system. 
                                                 
32 Again, other matching methods, such as kernel matching, lead to very similar results. 
33 We also carried out our analysis for the period 2001 to 2005, which leads to very similar results. The results 
are available from the authors upon request.  
34 Just like for the treatment “existence of profit sharing”, with “introduction of profit sharing” as treatment 
variable we sometimes lose observations due to the common support restriction and because in some cases one 
of the industry dummies causes perfectly predicted failure in the probit estimations. 
  24Thus, profit sharing has a direct and an indirect impact. Such direct and indirect effects may 
also be present if other incentive schemes are applied. However, compared with collective 
payments they may work differently. For example tournaments will not presumably 
encourage cooperation at the workplace and are therefore more often observed if agents work 
in isolation. The comparison of the effectiveness and usefulness of incentive systems in 
different situations and surroundings appears to be a promising research area.  Specific 
advantages in the use of a particular system and selectivity will probably not only be an issue 
with respect to profit sharing.  
Incentives affect the performance of an organization in many different ways. Aside of human 
capital other factors determining the performance of an organization may be affected, such as 
innovativeness or investment. In our view future research should focus on the many indirect 
ways in which incentives work. 
Most previous work of which we are aware takes profit sharing as a zero/one variable when 
applying company data, where all workers or none are covered. A crucial point of our 
approach is that we can observe and take into account the proportion of workers who are 
actually covered by a profit sharing scheme. To our knowledge there is no study taking into 
account the distribution of profit sharing intensity over establishments which has turned out to 
be very important for our results. The positive effects on training intensity are only present if 
the majority of the workforce participates in this group incentive payment. It would be 
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for 100% of 
employees 
Training intensity   0.219  0.337***  0.253**  0.377***  0.370*** 
Establishment size <20  0.518  0.224***  0.093***  0.330**  0.244*** 
Establishment size 20-49  0.206  0.233*  0.234  0.262**  0.205 
Establishment size 50-249  0.214  0.355***  0.455***  0.253  0.359*** 
Establishment size 250-499  0.041  0.100***  0.131***  0.090***  0.084*** 
Establishment size 500+  0.022  0.088***  0.087***  0.064***  0.108*** 
Number of employees   70.835  185.017***  176.333***  168.965***  204.406*** 
Shift  responsibilities  (dummy)  0.136  0.248*** 0.266*** 0.244*** 0.237*** 
Teamwork  (dummy)  0.073  0.136*** 0.173*** 0,131*** 0.113*** 
Independent work groups  
(dummy)  0.053  0.113*** 0.144*** 0,099*** 0.099*** 
Share of qualified employees 
(percent)  0.064  0.138*** 0.103*** 0.138*** 0.161*** 
Collective bargaining (dummy)  0.456  0.515***  0.574***  0.433  0.530*** 
Works council (dummy)   0.216  0.470***  0.462***  0.375***  0.542*** 
Export  share  0.063  0.142*** 0.136*** 0.106*** 0.171*** 
ICT investment (dummy)  0.388  0.643***  0.628***  0.612***  0.677*** 
Limited liability (dummy=1 if AG, 
GmbH)  0.616  0.824*** 0.914*** 0.708*** 0.842*** 
Age (dummy=1 if founded after 
1990)  0.521  0.487**  0.484 0.442*** 0.519 
East German establishment 
(dummy)  0.420 0.364***  0.327***  0.330*** 0.418 
N  4742  1075 312  312  443 
***/**/* indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level; refers to a t-test comparing the mean values of non-
profit sharing firms with the mean values of profit sharing firms and firms with different profit sharing intensities, 
respectively. 
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  Table A2 – Results of probit estimations (Existence of profit sharing) 
Variables   PS=1/PS=0 PS=2/PS=0 PS=3/PS=0 
Establishment size 20-49  0.678*** 0.253***  0.102 
Establishment size 50-249  0.979*** 0.236**  0.186** 
Establishment size 250-499  1.246*** 0.462***  0.108 
Establishment size 500+  1.378*** 0.447** 0.564*** 
Export share  0.046 0.400**  0.308** 
Share of qualified employees  0.571** 0.510**  0.859*** 
Collective bargaining  -0.005 -0.225*** 0.018 
Works council  0.071 0.122  0.379*** 
Limited liability  0.444*** 0.173** 0.416*** 
Age  0.103 -0.067 0.106 
East German establishment  -0.148* -0.051  0.056 
Shift of responsibilities  0.169** 0.231***  0.226*** 
Teamwork   0.166* 0.104 -0.092 
Independent work groups  0.204*  0.061  0.074 
ICT investment  0.183***  0.191***  0.361*** 
Number of observations  5009  5043  5185 
Pseudo R2        0.195  0.165  0.205 
***/**/* indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
  Source: IAB Establishment Panel, wave 2009, own calculations (controlled remote data access via FDZ). 
  Note: Industry dummies are included in the analysis but are not reported. 
 
 
Table A3 – Differences of mean values for multiple treatments after matching (Existence) –   multinomial 
logit estimation 
Variables   PS=1/PS=0 PS=2/PS=0 PS=3/PS=0 
Establishment size 20-49  0.003  -0.013  0.026 
Establishment size 50-249  0.000  -0.016  -0.026 
Establishment size 250-499  -0.001  0.016  0.015 
Establishment size 500+  0.001  0.014  0.001 
Export share  0.021  -0.004  0.001 
Shift responsibilities   -0.011  -0.013  0.017 
Teamwork   -0.017  -0.018  0.020 
Independent work groups    -0.006  0.021  0.023 
Share of qualified employees   0.016  0.022  0.009 
Collective bargaining   -0.032  0.037  0.003 
Works council   0.026  0.026  -0.029 
ICT investment   -0.016  0.019  -0.024 
Limited liability  -0.008  -0.014  -0.014 
Age   0.006  0.008  -0.027 
East German establishment  0.037  0.001  -0.042 
***/**/* indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
Source: IAB Establishment Panel, wave 2009, own calculations (controlled remote data access via FDZ). 
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Table A4 – Differences of mean values for multiple treatments after matching (Existence) – binary probit 
estimations 
Variables   PS=1/PS=0 PS=2/PS=0 PS=3/PS=0 
Establishment size 20-49  0.013  0.013  0.010 
Establishment size 50-249  -0.022  -0.011  0.007 
Establishment size 250-499  0.005  -0.010  -0.002 
Establishment size 500+  0.005  0.013  0.000 
Export  share  0.016 0.004 0.017 
Shift  responsibilities    -0.005 0.018 -0.018 
Teamwork   0.005  -0.002  -0.024 
Independent work groups    0.013  0.013  0.009 
Share of qualified employees   0.005  -0.012  -0.004 
Collective bargaining   0.000  0.035  0.001 
Works council   0.006  -0.014  -0.018 
ICT investment   0.047  -0.014  -0.007 
Limited liability  0.006  -0.014  0.003 
Age   -0.029  -0.059  -0.037 
East German establishment  0.002  -0.024  -0.038 
***/**/* indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. 




Table A5 – Average treatment effects on the treated for binary treatments 2009 
Treatment group  Matched firms without profit sharing  Training difference 
Matching 
All firms with profit sharing   N=1072
Training intensity: 0.337 
N=4742 
Training intensity: 0.265  0.072*** 
Conditional difference-in-differences     
All firms with profit sharing   N=333 
Training difference: 0.070 
N=3659 
Training difference: 0.004  0.066*** 
***/**/* indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
Source: IAB Establishment Panel, waves 2007-2009, own calculations (controlled remote data access via FDZ). 

















  33  Table A6 – Results of probit estimations (Introduction of profit sharing) 
Variables   PS=1/PS=0 PS=2/PS=0 PS=3/PS=0 
Establishment size 20-49  1.015*** 0.200*  -0.011 
Establishment size 50-249  1.198*** 0.058  0.038 
Establishment size 250-499  1.975*** 0.022  -0.218 
Establishment size 500+  1.489*** 0.176  0.140 
Export share  0.051 0.460** 0.312 
Share of qualified employees  -0.064 0.783*** 0.560* 
Collective bargaining  -0.036 -0.088  -0.281*** 
Works council  0.150 0.161  0.310** 
Limited liability  0.377** 0.150 0.309** 
Age  0.082 -0.205** 0.040 
East German establishment  -0.093 0.028 -0.027 
Shift of responsibilities  -0.061 0.110 0.182 
Teamwork   0.159 0.168 0.165 
Independent work groups  0.258  0.101  0.149 
ICT investment  0.123  0.171*  0.193* 
Number of observations  3513  3467  3735 
Pseudo R2        0.206  0.091  0.123 
***/**/* indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
  Source: IAB Establishment Panel, waves 2007-2009, own calculations (controlled remote data access via FDZ). 
  Note: Industry dummies are included in the analysis but are not reported. 
 
 
Table A7 – Differences of mean values for multiple treatments after matching (Introduction) –   
multinomial logit estimation 
Variables   PS=1/PS=0 PS=2/PS=0 PS=3/PS=0 
Establishment size 20-49  0.018  -0.044  -0.041 
Establishment size 50-249  0.018  0.063  0.032 
Establishment size 250-499  -0.024  0.011  -0.018 
Establishment size 500+  -0.012  -0.004  -0.005 
Export share  0.016  0.003  -0.015 
Shift responsibilities   0.049  0.011  -0.028 
Teamwork   0.018  -0.033  0.000 
Independent work groups    0.030  0.007  0.013 
Share of qualified employees   0.011  -0.002  0.011 
Collective bargaining   0.030  -0.007  0.041 
Works council   0.006  0.037  -0.018 
ICT investment   0.012  -0.019  0.037 
Limited liability  -0.024  0.033  0.018 
Age   -0.061  0.000  0.050 
East German establishment  -0.006  -0.070  -0.009 
***/**/* indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
Source: IAB Establishment Panel, waves 2007-2009, own calculations (controlled remote data access via FDZ). 
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Table A8 – Differences of mean values for multiple treatments after matching (Introduction) – binary 
probit estimations 
Variables   PS=1/PS=0 PS=2/PS=0 PS=3/PS=0 
Establishment size 20-49  -0.012  -0.015  0.040 
Establishment size 50-249  0.000  0.018  0.005 
Establishment size 250-499  0.000  0.000  -0.018 
Establishment size 500+  0.012  -0.010  0.005 
Export share  -0.022  0.012  0.020 
Shift responsibilities   0.012  0.007  -0.018 
Teamwork   0.012  0.022  -0.046 
Independent work groups    0.000  0.015  -0.032 
Share of qualified employees   0.010  0.020  0.003 
Collective bargaining   -0.012  0.015  0.059 
Works council   0.012  -0.004  0.032 
ICT investment   0.000  0.000  -0.014 
Limited  liability  -0.018 0.000 -0.005 
Age   -0.012  0.062  0.018 
East German establishment  -0.037  -0.004  0.009 
***/**/* indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
Source: IAB Establishment Panel, waves 2007-2009, own calculations (controlled remote data access via FDZ). 
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